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Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is recognized as a model public works
safety net program, which provides food and cash payments to households suffering from
food insecurity in return for labor that builds public infrastructure. In addition to the tar-
get benefits of food security and infrastructure development, PSNP’s participatory water-
shed management interventions, while not their primary objective, are already delivering
climate-change mitigation benefits by sequestering carbon in soils and biomass and reduc-
ing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from the agricultural, forestry and other land use
(AFOLU) sector. New opportunities for support from dedicated climate finance channels
could be opened up by quantifying the climate change mitigation benefits (a.k.a. carbon
benefits) generated by PSNP activities.
Global climate change is well under-
way and policies must be enacted
to reduce anthropogenic GHG emis-
sions through cost-effective mecha-
nisms such as land restoration.
It is now clear that the Earth’s climate is warming, and
that it is doing so in response to changes to the at-
mosphere resulting from human activities. A target
rise in global average surface temperature of no more
than 2° C has been widely advocated as required to
maintain the Earth system within safe limits. How-
ever, at current global emission rates, the world will
have exceeded its total budget to keep warming below
2°C within 25 years. Meeting targets to limit warm-
ing within this safety margin will require a concerted
and protracted global effort, and will require develop-
ing countries to adopt policies like Ethiopia’s ambitious
and forward-looking Climate-Resilient Green Economy
(CRGE) strategy. Sequestering carbon in soils and trees
is likely to be an essential element of any mitigation
scenario that achieves safe climate stabilization, mak-
ing land restoration works such as those conducted by
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) a
key part of an overall climate-change mitigation strat-
egy.
Ethiopia’s PSNP can dually provide
food security to millions of beneficia-
ries while contributing to global cli-
mate change mitigation.
Along with the looming challenge of global cli-
mate change, countries must also address poverty
and malnutrition endemic to the developing world.
One response mechanism is social safety net pro-
grams—developed to provide poor, vulnerable and
marginalized members of society with cash or in-kind
transfers to reduce negative impacts from economic, en-
vironmental or governance shocks and chronic stresses.
Public works safety net programs, in particular, are de-
signed with the dual objectives of providing temporary
employment and building and maintaining vital public
assets.
Ethiopia’s PSNP—heralded as a model public works
safety net program since its inception in 2005—has
deployed sustainable land management interventions
that cover hundreds of thousands of hectares. Data
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Figure 1: A highly degraded landscape (foreground) and a reforested area enclosure (background) showing sig-
nificant gains in biomass at PSNP-CSI site in Alaba Special Woreda, SNNPR, Ethiopia.
from PSNP’s Climate-Smart Initiative (CSI) demon-
strate that Ethiopia’s PSNP interventions harbor the po-
tential for the program to have a meaningful impact
on climate-change mitigation by sequestering carbon
in soils and biomass and reducing emissions of green-
house gases from the agricultural, forestry and other
land use (AFOLU) sector (see Box 1 and Figure 1).
Market-based mechanisms to reduce
GHGs comprise carbon taxes and car-
bon offset markets. The latter in-
centivize investments in technolo-
gies, projects and practices that re-
duce GHGs by creating demand for
carbon offset credits.
Economies across the globe are taking steps to mitigate
rising atmospheric GHG levels. Instruments that put a
price on GHGs in order to incentivize decarbonization
are termed market-based mechanisms and fall into two
categories: carbon taxation, and cap-and-trade systems.
At present, there over 60 carbon-pricing schemes (car-
bon taxes and cap-and-trade systems combined) valued
at about US$30 billion that are implemented or planned
within regulations capping GHG emissions at the sub-
national, national or international levels.
Cap-and-trade systems are a type of market mech-
anism that place a limit (cap) on annual emissions by
sector or jurisdiction and then allow emitters to buy
and sell (trade) excess emissions amongst regulated en-
tities. Carbon markets (aka carbon offset programs)
enable GHG-emitting entities—whether governments,
companies or other institutions—to offset their carbon
footprint by investing in external projects or activities
that reduce GHGs or sequester carbon. Carbon markets
can be utilized either for compliance with cap-and-trade
regulations or on a voluntary basis. The unit of transac-
tion utilized by the majority of carbon markets is one
tonne of carbon dioxide-equivalent (tCO2e), which is
used to quantify the tCO2e that a given project would
reduce.
At present, the only compliance market relevant to
Ethiopia’s PSNP is the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). But, even this market
is in a downturn, given uncertainties in international cli-
mate change negotiations. Voluntary carbon markets,
while considerably smaller in volume of offsets trans-
acted, continue to see demand especially for offsets cre-
ated from AFOLU sector projects.
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Figure 2: Topographic map of Ethiopia, depicting soil organic carbon (SOC) stocks at PSNP-CSI sites under project
(red bars) and business-as-usual (light blue bars) scenarios. Note that up to three times more SOC is stored under
project scenarios (Solomon et al., 2015).
Ethiopia’s PSNP land-restoration
works are strong candidates for car-
bon projects. However, several key
characteristics of AFOLU carbon
project development must be consid-
ered during planning and implemen-
tation phases.
For Ethiopia’s PSNP, there are several important consid-
erations that must be taken into account when consid-
ering development of carbon projects for carbon offset
programs in the AFOLU sector:
1. Carbon standards provide the guidelines, specifica-
tions and requirements that must be met to ensure
consistency amongst projects that are accepted under
a carbon market. Standards are developed by, and
are part-and-parcel of carbon markets. For Ethiopia’s
PSNP, an analysis of the most suitable carbon market
would include trends in terms of prices and volume
of carbon credits transacted, methodologies suited to
PSNP public works activities, and ease of project de-
velopment, among others.
2. For carbon markets to operate, GHG sources, sinks
and reservoirs (SSRs) must be quantified. To this end,
scientifically-based GHG accounting methodologies
(or protocols) are developed. These methodologies
document the steps to quantify carbon benefits of a
given emissions reduction activity or project. For
AFOLU sector projects, numerous forest-based and,
to a lesser extent, agriculture-based methodologies
have been published2 and are available for use by
Ethiopia’s PSNP project developers.
3. The use of geospatial techniques to delineate the ge-
ographic boundary of areas where activities are to
be implemented is a requisite for all GHG account-
ing methodologies in the AFOLU sector. Ethiopia’s
PSNP implementation entails suites of activities dis-
tributed across thousands of geographically uncon-
nected locations across the country. The leading car-
bon offset programs contain mechanisms to group
(or bundle) projects so that they fall within the over-
all project boundary, which, in turn, dictates which
SSRs must be quantified in order to calculate the net
carbon benefit of a project.
4. In some cases, the carbon project may induce addi-
tional unintended effects outside the project bound-
ary that can increase GHG emissions elsewhere.
These effects are known as leakage and are of par-
ticular concern in AFOLU projects where project in-
terventions may displace current land use activities.
All carbon offset programs recognize the importance
of identifying and mitigating leakage effects prior to
project implementation. One type of leakage of par-
ticular relevance to Ethiopia’s PSNP is the potential
for livestock to be displaced by area enclosures. This
leakage potential, along with others, must be identi-
fied and mitigation activities must be designed and
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Box 1. Carbon benefits of climate smart interventions in Ethiopia’s PSNP CSI consortium partners
at Cornell University projected the mitigation potential of PSNP interventions as compared to the
business-as-usual scenarios using field measurements and modeling techniques at 28 sites within six
Ethiopian regions. Using IPCC Tiers 1 and 2 methodologies1, the mean carbon benefit across all PSNP’s
CSI sites was estimated at 5.7 tCO2e ha-1 yr-1.
Figure 3: Summary of IPCC Tier 1 assessment carbon benefits by GHG flux category aggregated over
28 modeled sites. Black dots indicate median values, and boxes show interquartile range. SOC is soil
organic carbon. Reproduced from Woolf et al. (2015)1.
Biomass and SOC accumulation were the largest sinks of GHG fluxes contributing to the overall carbon
benefit (i.e., the difference between PSNP interventions and business-as-usual scenarios), contribut-
ing on average 2.3 and 2.2 tCO2e ha-1 yr-1, respectively, followed by reduced emissions of methane
from livestock management at 1.3 tCO2e ha-1 yr-1. Contributions from other GHG fluxes (primarily
attributable to fertilizer management) were negligible due to the low impact of PSNP on inorganic fer-
tilizer use in Ethiopia. Variability between PSNP sites was substantial (standard deviation 6.1 tCO2e
ha-1 yr-1) underscoring large differences across the landscape in potential carbon benefits. Nonethe-
less, at some sites the net carbon benefit exceeded 10 tCO2e ha-1 yr-1. When considering that Ethiopia’s
PSNP interventions cover hundreds of thousands of hectares, the potential for PSNP to have a mean-
ingful impact on climate change mitigation is compelling. Further details on the content of this box can
be found in Woolf et al. (2015)1.
implemented. There is also some evidence that par-
ticipants in PSNP activities may consequently invest
less effort in land improvements to their own farms,
due to the diversion of labor into PSNP. Such possible
forms of leakage should also be addressed.
5. Net GHG emissions over time are commonly es-
timated in what are known as scenarios. These
scenarios are measured relative to the initial state
of the system at time zero. In order to quantify
changes in GHG emissions resulting from a carbon
project, it is necessary to estimate what the emis-
sions would be in the absence of project implemen-
tation. This is known alternately as the baseline or
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. Activities that are
designed and implemented under a carbon project,
are then evaluated in relation to BAU, with the net
carbon benefits generated under the project scenario
defined as the incremental difference between total
emissions in the project and BAU scenarios. For
Ethiopia’s PSNP, identifying the business-as-usual
scenario may be a complex task. Ethiopia is de-
fined by highly variable agro-ecological zones and
cultural and socio-economic circumstances. Scenario
identification should focus in on those PSNP sites
that share similar biophysical and socio-economic at-
tributes, enabling them to be grouped under the aus-
pices of a single project, or on specific interventions
within PSNP that are designed specifically as carbon
finance projects.
6. A key requirement of all carbon markets is that the
GHG project would not have advanced without rev-
enues generated from sales of carbon credits. This
4
Figure 4: Climate smart land use interventions including terraces, soil bunds planted with multi-purpose perennial
legumes, cut-and-carry forage systems, and multi-story agroforestry systems at PSNP-CSI watershed in Damot
Gale Woreda, SNNPR, Ethiopia.
requirement that project implementation is depen-
dent on carbon finance is known as additionality.
The steps to demonstrate additionality build on those
used to identify the BAU scenario.
Carbon market trends in the AFOLU
sector reflect volatility related to un-
certainties in international commit-
ments to combat climate change.
Carbon markets support a wide range of GHG emis-
sions reduction projects, only some of which are in the
AFOLU sector. In the CDM, AFOLU projects only make
up a tiny fraction (approximately 1%) of the market
share of traded emissions reductions for reasons related
to complexity, financial constraints, and risk. While vol-
untary carbon markets only trade a small fraction of the
volume of the CDM and other compliance markets they
are nonetheless important because they serve as testing
grounds for new methodologies, tools, and technologies
and they have a high representation of methodologies
for the AFOLU sector and serve as important sources of
finance for sustainable land management.
Whereas the CDM has been in a slump since sup-
ply of carbon credits outstripped demand beginning
in late 2011, the trend in voluntary markets has been
more even-keeled. There was a slight downward trend
in terms of volume of traded GHG reductions in 2013
(the last year for which data is available) over previous
years but the price still hovered around US$5/tonne of
CO2e —a full order of magnitude higher than that of the
CDM.
Notwithstanding these historical data, the political
and technical landscape that underpins carbon markets
and their success is highly dynamic and, as a result, fu-
ture projections are difficult to make. As seen in the
global economic recession from which certain regions
are still emerging, carbon markets are tightly enmeshed
with the prosperity of both public and private sector ac-
tors. A new binding treaty emerging from COP-21 in
Paris that caps emissions and/or sets a price on carbon
would send a clear message that a robust carbon market
can be anticipated. As such, PSNP 4 managers should
be cognizant of developments with respect to the UN-
FCCC process.
AFOLU carbon projects generate
many additional social and environ-
mental co-benefits that can be quanti-
fied and marketed.
Carbon markets solely transact in volumes of GHG re-
ductions i.e., carbon credits. Yet, there are many addi-
tional social and environmental aspects that a project
can deliver to the community and region where it is im-
plemented. This is especially true for AFOLU projects
which often operate in a community-based context in
developing countries.
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Figure 5: Soil available phosphorous and total nitrogen (left graph) and soil organic carbon and cation exchange
capacity (right graph) to 1m depth in degraded vs. improved cropland and woodland at 12 PSNP-CSI sites.3
Market analyses show that “gourmet” carbon
projects with stacked benefits receive a price premium
in voluntary carbon markets. Ethiopia’s PSNP is well-
placed to take advantage of market interest in carbon
projects delivering co-benefits. For example, data from
PSNP-CSI support the conclusion that Ethiopia’s PSNP
public works interventions provide key ecosystem ser-
vices and benefits including soil fertility and productiv-
ity (see Figure 5)3 in addition to climate-regulating ben-
efits. PSNP 4 project developers should review require-
ments of the various programs that have developed
methodologies4 to quantify carbon project co-benefits
to assess options for marketing the many social and en-
vironmental benefits that PSNP brings to communities
across Ethiopia.
Recent advances in carbon markets
may allow for PSNP 4 activities to be
developed into carbon projects across
scales that match the ambitious na-
tional scope of PSNP.
The ambitious national scale of PSNP has already
demonstrated widespread benefits for communities and
the environment, not least of which is climate change
mitigation. But this very breadth represents a hurdle in
accessing AFOLU carbon markets which, to date, have
focused on project-based activities at scales many times
smaller than PSNP. Recent advances in carbon markets,
however, may allow for PSNP activities to be developed
into carbon projects across much larger areas within
Ethiopia.
First, carbon markets have moved to allow grouping
of diverse activities under the umbrella of one project
with the aim of lowering the administrative and fi-
nancial burden involved in developing carbon projects,
particularly for small-scale projects in the developing
world. Both the CDM and the leading voluntary carbon
offset program, Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), have
developed such bundling mechanisms. Under PSNP 4,
a grouped project could encompass a mosaic of SLM ac-
tivities within an extensive project boundary. GHG ben-
efits could be quantified for PSNP practices and project
activity instances could be added by watersheds or ke-
beles, as resources are made available.
Second, standardized methods have been developed
with the goal of streamlining the process of demonstrat-
ing additionality and/or identifying the BAU scenario.
These methods are a newer, potentially more attractive
approach for PSNP. Using standardized methods, entire
landscapes measuring millions of hectares at the scale
of the regional state in Ethiopia are theoretically targets
for development of carbon projects.
Additionality – the requirement that
a carbon project would not be feasi-
ble without the assistance of climate
finance – has important implications
for the Ethiopian PSNP context.
Additionality is the central tenet of carbon markets:
without it carbon offset projects can neither quantify
their climate change mitigation impacts, nor attribute
these impacts to the availability of climate finance. Cli-
mate finance is only applicable to activities that are
demonstrably additional. Additionality is therefore rig-
orously reviewed during project validation, and PSNP
must carefully analyze the options to demonstrate addi-
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tionality of any of its activities that seek climate finance.
Additionality cannot be demonstrated for PSNP
projects that a) have already been implemented, or b)
would occur in an ongoing PSNP program of work
without carbon finance. However, additionality may be
demonstrated for (in order of decreasing viability) i) an
expansion of PSNP, ii) improvements in implementation
of existing or planned PSNP, and iii) securing the con-
tinuation of PSNP activities when sites are returned to
community management after PSNP ends. All three of
these scenarios must demonstrate that they are not pos-
sible without carbon finance.
The third of these options would need to be consid-
ered on a site-by-site basis, with local conditions that
create a threat to the already established project being
demonstrated, while also making a credible case that
carbon finance would remove that threat. However,
such a case could be hard to establish for the national
PSNP program as a whole, making this an option most
likely restricted to local community carbon projects.
The second of these options, although feasible in
principal, may be constrained by the fact that not all car-
bon benefits of the PSNP carbon project sites would be
marketable, but only the additional carbon benefits ac-
crued directly as a result of carbon finance. This would
lead to lower carbon benefits per hectare being mar-
ketable, but without any associated reduction in devel-
opment or MRV costs per hectare, thus lowering the re-
turn to investment ratio achievable.
The most promising approach to achieving addition-
ality for PSNP to receive carbon finance would be to ex-
tend the PSNP program beyond what would otherwise
be achievable, and to do so using targeted landscape-
scale projects that minimize carbon project development
and MRV costs. This approach could be further stream-
lined by use of jurisdictional standardized methods.
Direct climate finance continues to be
by far the largest source of finance for
mitigation activities.
Whereas significant research and discussion has been
focused on the potential for carbon markets to spawn in-
vestments in climate change mitigation and adaptation
activities in developing countries, an analysis of carbon
finance trends shows that this has yet to crystallize. Not
carbon markets, but bi- and multi-lateral funding agen-
cies continue to be by far the largest source of finance
for mitigation (and adaptation) activities.
An emerging multi-laterally funded carbon-finance
instrument with potential to support PSNP 4 is the
Green Climate Fund (GCF). The six investment crite-
ria used by GCF are all highly compatible with PSNP.
While GCF represents perhaps the best near-term op-
portunity for financing additional implementation of
climate smart interventions through PSNP, there are
other established funds5 that may support PSNP or el-
ements thereof. These include bilateral funds linked
to the international development arms of industrial-
ized nations, and multilateral funds operated under the
purview of United Nations or World Bank agencies.
Conclusions and recommendations
Ethiopia’s PSNP is a model public works safety net
program that creates multiple social, economic, and
environmental benefits through climate-smart inter-
ventions. Using a combination of geospatial tech-
niques, field-based analytical methods and modeling,
the climate-change mitigation benefits of the program
were quantified on a subset of PSNP sites through
the CSI. These carbon benefits can be used by PSNP
administrators to pursue climate finance opportuni-
ties—whether from bi- and multilateral donor institu-
tions seeking to support climate smart sustainable de-
velopment priorities or public/private sector entities
looking to purchase carbon credits through compliance
or voluntary carbon markets. Indeed, data generated by
CSI has already been used to secure support for PSNP 4
from bilateral donors. Looking forward, there are sev-
eral important messages regarding the potential for cli-
mate finance to support Ethiopia’s PSNP:
1. Carbon offset markets are not currently in a state
to allow for ambitious proposals (although note that
non-market mechanisms of climate finance are in a
more robust state).
2. Nonetheless, there are encouraging signs within the
ongoing UNFCCC climate negotiations that i) bind-
ing international commitments to reduce GHG emis-
sions will be reached at COP-21 in Paris at the end of
2015, and ii) that carbon offset markets will likely be
one of the mechanisms made available for countries
to meet their reduction obligations.
3. If carbon markets do indeed grow substantially in
the near future—as they must if climate change is to
be kept within safe limits—then Ethiopia should act
now to insure that it is well-positioned to take ad-
vantage of market opportunities as they arise. It is,
therefore, recommended that a carbon market project
be developed for Ethiopia’s PSNP. Using a grouped
projects (VCS) or Programme of Activities (CDM) ap-
proach, such a project could encompass a mosaic of
sustainable watershed management activities within
an extensive project boundary; for example, cover-
ing up to four woredas across the PSNP regions and
totaling thousands to tens of thousands of hectares.
Such a project could have a market value of US$ 15 –
20 million over 20 – 30 years making it an ambitious
and worthwhile initiative.
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4. Site selection for carbon projects is critical. The high-
est carbon sequestration potential per hectare is in
the wetter and more fertile regions, whereas food se-
curity issues are more pervasive in the drier regions.
The low hanging fruit will be to develop projects that
generate the highest benefit to cost ratio in terms of
carbon sequestration potential per unit area. How-
ever, the drier regions also stand to benefit greatly
from the food security and ecosystem rehabilitation
improvements that carbon projects offer. Therefore,
there are strong rationales for initiating and incubat-
ing pilot projects in both more humid and in dryer
regions, to build the in-country capacity for carbon
finance across varying agroecological zones that will
be key to contributing to Ethiopia’s overall climate-
smart development goals.
5. Carbon projects developed in the near future must
be sized to be compatible with the current volumes
of transactions in carbon markets. It is not realistic to
attempt to finance a project on the scale of the whole
of PSNP through carbon markets at the present time.
6. To ensure compliance with the additionality require-
ment of climate finance, any carbon project seek-
ing climate finance should be a demonstrably new
project that was not already planned or financed by
PSNP.
7. Project costs have historically often been compara-
ble to, or sometimes greater than, the funds accessed
through climate finance. Therefore keeping project
costs as low as possible, while maintaining the rigor
demanded of climate finance mechanisms, must be a
high priority.
8. To lay the foundation for larger jurisdictional car-
bon projects, Ethiopia’s PSNP should pursue devel-
opment of standardized methods in VCS or other
relevant markets to quantify carbon benefits across
much larger land areas more applicable to the scope
of PSNP. These jurisdictional approaches should best
be based on agroecological and livelihood zones to
facilitate GHG accounting across reasonably homo-
geneous climatic, ecological, and socio-cultural re-
gions; for example, the dry highlands of Tigray and
Amhara, and the relatively wetter highlands of Oro-
mia and SNNPR. The semi-arid and arid lowland re-
gions of Ethiopia, although they are chronically vul-
nerable and their resilience to climate change can
benefit from improved land management and reha-
bilitation, they are more challenging environments to
establish carbon projects in the near future. Further
research should be undertaken to establish the best
climate smart practices with proven carbon benefits
that are socio-economically viable at scale in these re-
gions.
9. The Oromia Forested Landscape Program (OFLP) is
a REDD+ pilot project that is breaking new ground
to develop jurisdictional approaches that will be rel-
evant primarily to large-scale forest ecosystems. Al-
though some PSNP activities (i.e., area enclosures fo-
cused on forest regeneration within Oromia) could
benefit from OFLP’s outputs, there are strong ratio-
nales to pursue additional climate finance avenues
within the wider PSNP context:
(a) For PSNP’s diverse suite of climate smart land
management practices on agricultural lands (in-
cluding cropland improvements, agroforestry
and sustainable forage production), Oromia is
too large a scale, given the current complexities
of developing GHG accounting methodologies
for smallholder agricultural systems.
(b) OFLP is a much-needed effort, but will take sev-
eral years to establish the required methodolo-
gies before GHG-reducing activities can com-
mence and finance begin to flow. But, PSNP
and the government of Ethiopia (GoE) can ben-
efit from gaining experience now by develop-
ing smaller scale project(s) using established
methodologies and market channels in addition
to developing standardized methods specifically
tailored to PSNP’s diverse suite of climate smart
land management practices.
(c) The unique aspect of PSNP is that it opens a
novel opportunity for food-security interven-
tions to be a vehicle for climate change mitiga-
tion. The clear opportunity to access new fund-
ing from carbon markets and multi- or bi-lateral
sources is compelling, not only for PSNP but
other safety nets and food security programs
in Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. In this re-
gard, PSNP could be a trailblazer by provid-
ing valuable lessons to facilitate future scaling-
up of land-based climate change mitigation ef-
forts that are coupled with food security inter-
ventions. It could also provide an opportunity to
enhance the long-term endurance and sustain-
ability of such systems beyond the life time of
the food security program.
10. A proposal should be developed and submitted to
the development partners to support creation of a
task team within the CRGE unit under the umbrella
of the Ministry of Agriculture for climate finance of
PSNP.
11. Notwithstanding the potential of carbon offset pro-
grams to support PSNP, direct income from bi- and
multilateral donors in the form of grants and loans
remains the mainstay of climate finance opportuni-
ties at present.
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12. The GCF is an attractive emerging multilateral cli-
mate fund for Ethiopia’s PSNP public works based
on its fit with GCF’s six top-level investment criteria,
not least of which is a project’s climate change miti-
gation and adaptation potential. To avoid jeopardiz-
ing or conflicting with potential submissions to GCF
from the GoE for a larger multi-sectoral proposal,
there should be communication between PSNP ad-
ministrators and the GoE when preparing proposals
for submission to GCF.
13. The potential for demonstrated mitigation benefits of
Ethiopia’s PSNP to be used in support of negotia-
tions for development funding should not be over-
looked. This is known as results-based finance and is
increasingly used by international donors to justify
expenditures. For example, the UK Department for
International Development (DfID) has already used
results on PSNP’s net carbon benefits generated by
the Cornell CSI group to support the business case
for release of funds from the UK International Cli-
mate Fund (ICF) to further support Ethiopia’s PSNP.
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